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Regaining the Technological Edge: 
Authoritarians, Democracies, IT 
Innovation’s Future1 
Andrea Little Limbago2 
 
Policy, law, and ethics lag behind technology.3 This is a common refrain that accurately 
reflects the reality in democratic states, but is not necessarily the case for authoritarian regimes. 
Authoritarian states have much more quickly embraced technological changes and innovations to 
further entrench regime durability, including information control. The slipping innovation 
dominance, and innovation gap between authoritarian and democratic regimes, therefore, may be 
one of stagnant political innovation as opposed to slipping technological innovation. Authoritarian 
regimes have more adeptly embraced digital technologies to further their domestic and 
international objectives while democratic regimes’ laissez-faire and myopically optimistic 
approach has left them scrambling to understand and influence the digital domain. The United 
States must reassert global leadership in shaping the future of the internet. That leadership will 
require a broader acknowledgement of full-spectrum cyber behavior, including the policies and 
laws required to benefit democratic values and norms. With that acknowledged, the U.S. risk 
obsolescence in shaping the future international order. 
Authoritarian Policy Innovation 
For decades while tech sectors and governments in democracies were singularly focused 
on the promises of a technological utopia, authoritarian regimes have pursued strategies exploiting 
internet expansion for information control. These activities often are first tested on domestic 
                                                 
1 Limbago, Andrea Little, “Regaining the Technological Edge: Authoritarians, Democracies, IT Innovation’s 
Future,” in Demchak, Chris C. and Benjamin Schechter, eds. Military Cyber Affairs: Systemic Cyber Defense 3, no. 
2 (2018). 
2 Chief Social Scientist at Virtru 
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populations, expanded to international targets, and at times replicated by other states. In this 
manner, domestic populations provide the initial testbed for data manipulation, censorship, and 
destructive attacks which is then applied to international targets.  For instance, China tests 
techniques for both espionage campaigns as well as disinformation on Taiwan before deploying 
them to global targets.4 Moreover, China’s Great Firewall has inspired Iran’s Halal Network and 
Russian cyber sovereignty, instigating discussions of a global splinternet as opposed to a globally 
integrated system.  
In addition, data localization efforts that require data or domains to physically operate 
within borders greatly impacts cross-border data flows and international business while giving 
authoritarian regimes unique access to personal and commercial data. For instance, in 2005 
Kazakhstan required all .kz top-level domain names to operate on servers within its borders.5 In 
Iran, extensive online censorship coupled with requirements for local data storage from apps such 
as WhatsApp and Telegram are key components of their information control. Importantly, these 
tactics have expanded into weak democracies such as Turkey where the Law on the Protection of 
Personal Data limits the transfer of personal data out of Turkey, while requiring some data stored 
in country as well. In fact, a similar law a decade earlier targeting Internet-based payment services 
led PayPal to withdraw. 
The two most prominent examples of this authoritarian, cyber sovereignty model are China 
and Russia. While they share some similarities, there also are some distinctions and so it is worth 
providing a high-level overview of their approach to data localization and cyber sovereignty as 
these are the models that are inspiring others across the globe. 
Chinese Model 
In October, Chinese President Xi Jinping thoroughly detailed his vision of Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics that includes internet control to "oppose and resist the whole range of 
erroneous viewpoints".6 This emphasis on cyber sovereignty reinforces China’s cybersecurity 
law which similarly places the government as the protector and manager of online content.7 
                                                 
4 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/05/opinion/china-cyberattack-hacking-us-midterm-election.html 
5 https://itif.org/publications/2017/05/01/cross-border-data-flows-where-are-barriers-and-what-do-they-cost 
6 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-41744675 
7 https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/digichina/blog/chinas-cybersecurity-law-one-year/ 
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According to the law, data localization requirements focus on critical infrastructure businesses and 
firms with access to personal data. For over a decade, China has demanded foreign corporations 
turn over data, but this new law tightens the requirements and blacklists corporations who fail to 
comply.8 While the definition of critical infrastructure remains vague, the law could undermine 
foreign intellectual property and the privacy of individual data held by corporations operating in 
China.9 The law went into effect in 2017, and is expected to impact those companies leveraging 
big data the most, greatly increasing data processing costs and logistical challenges for 
companies.10 With the larger movement toward AI and the internet of things, this law has farther 
reaching impact, including on companies such as social media platforms that host web content and 
websites in China.11 
The repercussions of China’s data localization extends beyond its own sovereign borders. 
For instance, China has led several efforts to integrate state internet control requirements into 
United Nations documents focused on global cyber norms.12 China also seeks to control Chinese 
language media and content external to its borders as part of a broader strategy to garner influence 
abroad.13 Domestically, China’s emphasis on government control of data has enabled a 
nascent social credit system that perhaps best personifies the striking repercussions of competing 
approaches to data protection.14 As revealed in 2014, China is developing a national system to 
track and rate the reputations of individuals and businesses. It will increasingly influence all 
aspects of life, including loan applications, dating profiles, job prospects, airplane ticket purchases, 
travel, and property ownership.15 Individuals are scored based on a range of factors such as 
financial debt, deviation from state-approved online content, and the scores of others within your 
social networks.  
                                                 
8 https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2007/11/yahoo-calls-withholding-of-info-on-chinese-arrests-a-
misunderstanding/ 
9 https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-blurry-cyber-laws-give-u-s-tech-companies-no-security-1512558004 
10 http://www.china-briefing.com/news/2018/01/04/chinas-digital-economy-shape-things-come.html 
11 https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/06/01/china_cybersecurity_law/ 
12 https://thediplomat.com/2015/12/china-brings-push-for-cyber-sovereignty-to-the-un/ 
13 http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-06-04/australian-sovereignty-under-threat-from-chinese-influence/8583832 
14 https://www.wired.com/story/age-of-social-credit/ 
15 https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/chinese-blacklist-an-early-glimpse-of-sweeping-new-social-credit-
control/article37493300/?utm_medium=Referrer:+Social+Network+/+Media&utm_campaign=Shared+Web+Article
+Links 
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Finally, China already blocks several U.S. internet companies, and further assists in 
domestic development of Chinese competitors. This too has great global impact, as 
Tencent passed Facebook last year in market capitalization.16 Tencent also has ten percent stake in 
Snapchat’s parent company Snap.17 Other Chinese tech giants such as Alibaba and Baidu continue 
to expand as well. Although they are not technically state-owned enterprises, these companies 
influence China’s capabilities for internet and data control, including a dominant 
role positioning China to emerge as the global leader in AI, and further strengthening localized 
government control of data.18 
Russian Model 
China and Russia share many similarities in their push for cyber sovereignty and data 
localization, including a bilateral ‘nonagression pact’ for mutual support of sovereignty and 
refraining from attacks.19 Russia is best known for various high profile breaches and a propaganda 
machine of troll factories and disinformation that seeks to disrupt elections across the globe, divide 
societies, and weaken democracies.20 However, there is much more to the Russian approach, 
including a strict focus on cyber sovereignty to simultaneously control domestic information, 
expand data localization policies globally, and shape the global digital infrastructure. 
In 2015, a new Russian law required all data collected on Russian citizens to be stored and 
processed on servers in Russia.21 This law equally applies to countries outside of Russia, and has 
already resulted in the blocking of websites owned by U.S. companies. Recently, Russia has 
pressured Facebook to detail how it is adhering to this law, and is stepping up pressure on foreign 
corporations for compliance.22 Russia’s 2016 information security doctrine outlines its far-
reaching approach to information security, including an integration of both the technical and the 
                                                 
16 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2017/11/21/chinas-biggest-social-media-company-tencent-now-worth-
facebook/ 
17 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2017/11/08/wechat-owner-tencent-takes-10pc-stake-snap/ 
18 https://www.scmp.com/tech/china-tech/article/2120913/china-recruits-baidu-alibaba-and-tencent-ai-national-team 
19 https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2015/08/russia-china-cyber-nonaggression-pact/119302/ 
20 https://www.thenation.com/article/russias-attacks-on-democracy-arent-only-a-problem-for-america/ 
21 https://www.datacenterknowledge.com/archives/2015/07/21/russian-data-localization-law-spurs-data-center-
strategy-changes 
22 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-russia-data/russia-asks-facebook-how-it-complies-with-data-law-
ifax-idUSKBN1HJ2AB 
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social and psychological components of digital information control.23 Russia also requires foreign 
companies to provide source code for security products as a cost of doing business there.24 Two 
pieces of legislation in 2017 further focus on data control, eliminating anonymity online and 
restricting tools to evade censorship, including VPNs and anonymizers.25 
Russia has embraced many aspects of China’s internet strategy, working to create its own 
‘Great Firewall’ (dubbed the Red Web), and continues to rise in global measures for censorship 
and surveillance.26 Whereas China tends to censor content based on keywords and limiting 
collective expression and congregation, Russian censorship focuses more on cultural 
control, fostering self-censorship in publications, websites, and media due to nebulous 
guidelines.27 Russia often first deploys various forms of Russian information security 
domestically, such as fostering societal divisions through disinformation, before applying them 
internationally. 
Additionally, as part of the broader effort to leverage data collection for domestic control, 
Moscow recently introduced a new facial recognition capability within a city-wide camera 
network.28 While depicted as a means to capture criminals, it has massive privacy implications and 
contributes to the ongoing expansion of domestic surveillance. Finally, Russia is actively 
attempting to shape global information flows. For example, Russia recently provided 
the infrastructure to expand North Korean internet access, resulting in 60% more internet access 
thanks to this second connection.29 Simultaneously, Russia has proposed building an independent 
                                                 
23 https://www.forbes.com/sites/seanlawson/2016/12/09/russia-gets-a-new-information-security-
doctrine/#5341a8a63fc4 
24 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-russia-tech-insight/under-pressure-western-tech-firms-bow-to-russian-
demands-to-share-cyber-secrets-idUSKBN19E0XB 
25 https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/08/01/russia-new-legislation-attacks-internet-anonymity, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-41829726 
26 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2017/04/russia_is_trying_to_copy_china_s_internet_censorsh
ip.html , https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/29/putin-china-internet-great-firewall-russia-cybersecurity-
pact 
27 https://gking.harvard.edu/publications/how-censorship-china-allows-government-criticism-silences-collective-
expression 
28 https://techcrunch.com/2017/09/28/moscow-officially-turns-on-facial-recognition-for-its-city-wide-camera-
network/ 
29 https://www.forbes.com/sites/outofasia/2017/12/01/russia-is-now-providing-north-korea-with-internet-what-that-
could-mean-for-cyber-warfare/#4546d300386b 
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internet infrastructure among the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South 
Africa), which includes an alternate domain name system which would allow each country greater 
autonomy and control over access to specific websites.30 This alternate internet, combined with 
data sovereignty, is intended to grant Russia greater autonomy and control of digital information. 
Democratic Responses 
For the most part, democracies have not evolved at the same pace as authoritarian regimes 
in their digital policy innovation. In the United States, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act from 
1986 remains the benchmark bill guiding appropriate online activity. Instead, the European Union 
is currently the leading democratic entity shaping individual security and privacy online, and 
establishing appropriate behavior and access in cyberspace. The General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) is the most prominent policy that reflects key tenets of the multi-stakeholder 
model, including an emphasis on individual privacy and civil liberties. At its core, the GDPR 
maintains a strong emphasis on individual data protections, which includes personally identifiable 
data (PII), but extends to content about an individual. Key data protection features within the 
GDPR are the right to erasure (aka the right to be forgotten), and the right for an individual to 
access their data and rectify incorrect data.31  It is a far-reaching framework that impacts everything 
from marketing to artificial intelligence to breach notification.32 Importantly, the GDPR 
introduces data standards that pertain to data of European Union citizens regardless of where the 
data is held.33 Even if a corporation is not headquartered in the EU, but they have data on EU 
citizens, they must comply with the GDPR. 
The EU’s push toward individual data protection and privacy is not surprising in the wake 
of the increasingly unprecedented magnitude and scope of corporate data breaches. The 
GDPR also reinforces the values and norms of individual freedoms and humans rights that 
                                                 
30 https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/government/russia-wants-to-launch-backup-dns-system-by-august-1-
2018/ 
31 https://gdpr-info.eu/art-17-gdpr/ 
32 http://searchcrm.techtarget.com/feature/Accommodating-GDPR-email-marketing-regulations-a-top-priority, 
http://www.aitech.law/blog/data-privacy-ai-and-the-gdpr , https://gdpr-info.eu/art-33-gdpr/ 
33 http://www.itsecurityguru.org/2017/01/30/impact-gdpr-outside-eu/ 
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are foundational to the EU.34 In this way, data regulation frameworks intersect with and adhere 
very closely to their native political institutions. The GDPR reflects the political and economic 
union of 28 democratic members, prioritizing the data protection and individual rights that 
reinforce democratic institutions. In turn, with the additional emphasis on corporate responses to 
data breaches, the GDPR advances specific norms for security and privacy within a regulatory 
framework. 
While the GDPR is the result of years’ worth of negotiations, compromises, and corporate 
input, the United States lacks anything remotely similar and more so reflects a patchwork of 
proposals with an unknown time frame or probability for implementation.35 The U.S. has taken a 
sector-specific approach to data privacy, such as the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act. Lacking a national policy, individual states are seeking their own solutions, 
such as current proposals in Georgia to modify the CFAA, or the city of Los Angeles, which 
required Google to store data within the U.S. as a contractual condition.36 This recent 
Congressional hearings on social media manipulation and data privacy demonstrated how nascent 
these discussion are, wherein the idea of regulation was floated, but remains nebulous at best. The 
Honest Ads Act is one proposal where social media would be regulated similar to traditional media, 
but currently has not significantly progressed toward implementation, and does not address data 
privacy concerns.  
Social Blowback, Technological Change & Policy Innovation 
However, all is not lost for democracies. Current trajectories should not be assumed to be 
permanent or unwavering. Authoritarian regimes do not face the same constraints those in 
democracies, and have adeptly exploited this gap through digital interference at home and abroad 
in pursuit of regime objectives. To date, this has given them the edge and enabled innovative 
tactics, techniques and procedures to optimize information control. Nevertheless, the persistence 
of this trajectory should not be assumed. Russia’s recent attempt to block the popular messaging 
                                                 
34 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_2.1.2.html 
35 https://www.accessnow.org/data-protection-in-the-united-states-where-do-we-go-from-here/ 
36 http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/en-US/display/20172018/SB/315 , 
https://itif.org/publications/2017/05/01/cross-border-data-flows-where-are-barriers-and-what-do-they-cost 
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app, Telegram, is a case in point.37 After Russia’s censor Roskomnadzor attempted to block 
Telegram due to its failure to comply to Russian information laws, numerous proxies were 
established to circumvent the ban. In response, Russia expanded the censorship, unintentionally 
blocking millions of IP addresses, including those at grocery stores, taxi companies, ticket 
agencies, and some social media and e-commerce sites.38 The ban led to a major backlash, 
referenced to as an ‘internet civil war’, an uptick in Telegram downloads, and igniting greater 
resistance against other censorship efforts. The Russian Education Ministry’s Science Council 
even released a statement that these internet outages have locked researchers out of online services 
that are “extremely important for scientific work.”39 The laws have also stimulated capital flight 
and hindered the business environment. 
In this regard, technology not only enables authoritarian regimes, but also enables social 
change within the authoritarian regimes as well. For example, blockchain and social media have 
enabled pent-up anger over sexual harassment and is showing unprecedented signs of a #metoo 
movement at several top Chinese universities.40 Similarly, digital currencies reflect this dual-use 
nature of digital technologies. Venezuela and North Korea attempt to leverage digital currencies 
to circumvent sanctions, but so do domestic protesters as concern over the economic climate 
mounts and provides access to the global economy. Moreover, many of the digital natives are 
becoming more tech savvy, finding means to circumvent censors and bans via changes in 
geolocation tagging, or VPNs, for example. Finally, this closed-off, autarkic approach to data has 
been found to have a negative impact on innovation and science.41 
Given the role of data security and privacy as a cornerstone of human rights and democracy 
in the digital age, the U.S. would benefit from renewed focus on innovation in the policy domain, 
not just technology. The internet is a socio-technical problem that for the most part has been 
addressed solely through a technical lens. Interestingly, there also is social change within the 
                                                 
37 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/04/internet-civil-war-erupted-russia-180423124936679.html 
38 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-22/putin-s-turf-war-with-telegram-escalates-as-russia-blocks-
ips 
39 https://gizmodo.com/russia-is-still-trashing-its-internet-two-weeks-into-it-1825561879 
40 https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-universities-face-a-metoo-moment-1524394801 
41 http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/08/science-suffers-china-s-internet-censors-plug-holes-great-firewall 
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United States demanding greater regulation for data security and privacy, which just may be the 
impetus required to ignite policy innovation in the digital domain.42  
The international system is at an inflection point, and requires leadership and policy 
innovation by the United States. This is not to discount the diminishing technological gap, but 
technology and policy are interconnected. The current patchwork, sector specific and Cold War-
mentality approach to the digital age in the United States is obsolete, and is hindering technological 
innovation as well.  
This is not only a problem in digital technologies, but across the broader lens of 
technological innovation. For instance, China, France and the United Kingdom have new AI 
strategies, but nothing similar seems on the radar in the U.S.43 Each of these directly challenge 
U.S. technological leadership, even though the Chinese version is based on an Obama-era 
document on AI research and development.44 Similarly, cryptocurrencies and cryptomining attacks 
is another area where other governments have moved forward to block or regulate these exchanges, 
while the United States remains in discussion mode.45  And these current challenges will pale in 
comparison to the imminent digital challenges, including video and voice mimicry and the 
proliferation of actors and attacker techniques that are directly related to data security and privacy.  
Importantly, and counter to claims that data is the new Cold War, the U.S. must not focus 
policies honed and tuned for a Cold War environment.46 This is not Cold War 2.0, but a new 
situation where technology has greatly impacted power dynamics, and will continue to do so for 
the foreseeable future. The U.S. must close the gap between technological and policy innovation, 
focusing holistically on data protections, defenses, and responses, ensuring reinforcement of 
democratic values. Absent any movement, the global vacuum is being filled by authoritarian 
                                                 
42 https://www.axios.com/axios-surveymonkey-public-wants-big-tech-regulated-5f60af4b-4faa-4f45-bc45-
018c5d2b360f.html 
43 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/12/technology/china-trump-artificial-intelligence.html, 
https://techcrunch.com/2018/03/29/france-wants-to-become-an-artificial-intelligence-hub/, 
http://fortune.com/2018/04/25/uk-ai-artificial-intelligence-deal/ 
44 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC/national_ai_rd_stra
tegic_plan.pdf 
45 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-crypto-currencies-congress/congress-sets-sights-on-federal-cryptocurrency-
rules-idUSKCN1G31AG 
46 https://www.wired.com/story/opinion-new-data-cold-war 
9
Limbago: Regaining the Technological Edge
Published by Scholar Commons, 2018
10 
 
regime, shaping not only the future of the internet, but widespread technological applications that 
directly influence the future for security, privacy and democracy. 
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